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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has long held that its goal in crafting the 
jurisprudence surrounding sexual harassment cases brought under Title 
VII has been to eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace, to 
encourage victims to report harassment promptly, and to set in place 
adequate incentives for employers to stave off the harms associated with 
sexual harassment.1  This Article, however, contends that in constructing 
the framework within which sexual harassment claims are adjudicated, 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New York 
University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University.  I wish to thank Janet 
Reinke for her assistance throughout the completion of this article.  I would like to thank Professor 
Matthew Mirow for his comments and insight.  This article was completed with the research 
assistance and hard work of my research assistant, Vanessa Ortiz.  I wish to thank my husband, 
Joshua Stone, and my parents, Ted and Donna Bauchner, for their unfaltering love and support.  I 
would also like to thank Sam Estreicher. 
 1. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see generally Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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the Supreme Court might have actually incentivized employers to deal 
with each isolated harassment complaint in a vacuum, ensuring nothing 
more than that the specific reporting victim at issue is not harassed again 
by the same harasser.2 
Based on the affirmative defense available to defendant employers 
in cases in which no tangible employment action has been inflicted by a 
harasser, a one-time incident between a given harasser and a given 
victim, even one of rape, may very well be not ultimately compensable 
under Title VII.3  Thus, a recidivist harasser who harasses different 
victims at different times may, under the current state of the law, repeat 
and even escalate his behavior, without incurring Title VII liability for 
his employer.  This Article proposes that courts change the way in which 
they adjudicate Title VII disputes by evaluating the harm avoidance 
demonstrated by plaintiffs and employers in light of the totality of what 
each party knew or should have known about the potential harm, and 
what each party did or could have done to prevent it.  Specifically, this 
Article is premised on the ideas that 1) harassment complaints are, 
typically, initially dealt with internally; often, an employer will 
remediate reported harassment by ordering or granting a transfer to 
separate a harasser and his victim;4 and 2) many harassers are, in fact 
recidivists.5 
Employer liability for supervisory harassment is conferred 
automatically upon defendants when a plaintiff has, in the course of her 
harassment, incurred or endured a “tangible employment action,” like a 
pay cut, demotion, or termination, which is seen to have been ratified by 
the entity.6  In harassment scenarios where no such action was taken, the 
defendant can interpose an affirmative defense, asserting both that “the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior,”7 and that “the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”8  
As one scholar has noted, “[b]y creating this . . . affirmative defense for 
employers, the Supreme Court is, in effect, telling women that they must 
be willing to come forward and complain to employers about sexual 
 2. See discussion infra Section III. 
 3. See discussion infra Section IV. 
 4. See discussion infra Section II. 
 5. See discussion infra Section II. 
 6. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 7. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 8. Id.  
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harassment before filing suit.  Otherwise, they risk losing their right to 
obtain any legal redress under federal law.”9 
Courts have found again and again that the law’s requirement that 
an employer provide a prompt remedial response to a harassment 
complaint is met where the harasser is retained (with or without a slap 
on the wrist) and merely transferred away from the victim.10  Where the 
harasser in question is a recidivist, this contravenes Title VII’s goal of 
eradicating harassment. Specifically, employers with harassers who 
otherwise add value to their enterprise are incentivized to retain these 
individuals, and, fully cognizant of their harassing or violent tendencies, 
are not amply deterred from merely shuffling or transferring them 
around so as to put a bandaid on the instant situation.11  The courts have 
given little regard, and thus employers have given little thought, to the 
plight of future victims subjected to the supervision of recidivist 
harassers or abusers. 
The premise of this Article, then, is straightforward. Because so 
many harassers are recidivists,12 and because of the fact that so many 
employers are able, under the current state of the law, to fulfill their 
obligation to remediate reported harassment by simply separating the 
victim and her harasser,13 many employees will fall victim to known 
harassers.  Moreover, because of the way in which courts have applied 
the affirmative defense, the employer, having never received a complaint 
from that victim, will typically evade liability for any “new” act of 
harassment (i.e., one with a new victim), irrespective of how severe it 
was.14  This Article thus posits that in instances where an employer 
situated a known harasser to supervise a new group of people, the risk 
that the harasser will offend again should fall on the employer, which 
acted affirmatively and with knowledge of the existing risk in retaining 
the employee, rather than on the employee, who, under current case law, 
 9. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call For 
Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 11. See id. at 569-70. 
 12. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall et al., Initiation, Desistance, and Persistence of Men’s Sexual 
Coercion, 74 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 732, 732 (2006) (“[T]here is evidence of 
sexual offenders being at higher risk for reoffense than other types of offenders.”).  “In a review of 
61 studies and nearly 24,000 sexual offenders, the recidivism rate for new sexual offenses within a 
4- to 5-year period was 13.4%.”  Id. 
 13. West, supra note 9, at 461 (“A disturbing trend is developing among the federal courts.  
They are interpreting ‘reasonable care’ in the first prong of the new affirmative defense to require 
only minimal prevention efforts by the employer.”). 
 14. See discussion infra Section VII. 
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must absorb the initial act of harassment and report it before she can 
potentially be compensated under Title VII.15  Courts can accomplish 
this by finding that the affirmative defense, designed to afford employers 
notice of a problem and an opportunity to remediate it, cannot be met 
where the plaintiff has sustained otherwise actionable harm without the 
opportunity to report it before it occurred, and where the employer 
situated a known harasser as that victim’s supervisor.16 
Specifically, when dealing with a single act of recidivist harassment 
that cannot be reported preemptively, but which rises, due to its severity, 
to the level of being actionable, courts ought to find that the defendant 
cannot, as a matter of law, meet its burden of showing that “the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior.”17  Thus, in cases involving single acts of 
the most noxious and nefarious variety, such as rapes and physical 
assaults, plaintiffs who would otherwise fall through the cracks for want 
of an opportunity to report the harm, may be made whole for the harm 
that they have sustained in certain circumstances. 
In 1998, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve widespread 
disagreement and confusion among circuit courts as to how and when to 
impute liability to a plaintiff’s employer for supervisory sexual 
harassment sustained by the plaintiff.18  In the cases of Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth19 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,20 the 
Supreme Court, mindful of its previous holding that “agency principles 
constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory 
harassment,”21 was careful to steep its resolution of the issue in the law 
of agency.22  In this vein, the Court noted that while “a supervisor’s 
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a 
particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is 
aided by the agency relation,”23 essentially, “most workplace tortfeasors 
are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of 
the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive 
 15. See discussion infra Section VII. 
 16. See discussion infra Section VII. 
 17. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth 
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 18. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, Faragher, 524 U.S. 775. 
 19. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. 
 20. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. 
 21. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 
(1986)). 
 22. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 776; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55. 
 23. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. 
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pool of potential victims.”24  The Court thus concluded that it could not 
confer strict liability upon employers for all acts of supervisory 
harassment because “[t]he aided in the agency relation standard . . . 
requires the existence of something more than the employment relation 
itself.”25 
So, the Court reasoned, a supervisor’s tangible employment action 
transforms into an act of the employer because: 
[w]hen a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is 
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency 
relation. . . . As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other 
person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of 
injury . . . .  Tangible employment actions fall within the special 
province of the supervisor.  The supervisor has been empowered by the 
company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions 
affecting other employees under his or her control.  Tangible 
employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the 
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.  A tangible 
employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a 
company act . . . .  The supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of 
the enterprise and use its internal processes.26 
The Court thus bifurcated harassment claims, isolating those in 
which a harassed employee sustained what it called a “tangible 
employment action,” which “constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.”27  A defendant employer, the 
Court held, was automatically liable for sexual harassment where the 
plaintiff had sustained a tangible employment action.28  In the absence 
of a tangible employment action, the Court held that the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case, once successfully made, would be rendered vulnerable to the 
interposition of a two-pronged affirmative defense asserting that 1) “the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior,”29 and 2) “that the plaintiff employee 
 24. Id. at 760. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 761-62. 
 27. Id. at 761. 
 28. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 29. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
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unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”30 
In 2004, the Supreme Court held that even a constructive discharge, 
the legal point at which a court determines that any reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s shoes would have felt compelled to quit employment, is 
not tantamount to a tangible employment action sufficient to insulate a 
plaintiff’s claim from the interposition of the affirmative defense.31  The 
Court held that “when an official act does not underlie the constructive 
discharge, the Ellerth and Faragher analysis . . . calls for extension of 
the affirmative defense to the employer,” because the plaintiff’s decision 
to leave does not, unlike an act that bears the imprimatur of the 
enterprise, afford the defendant notice of the harassment.32  Thus, any 
harassment scenario, irrespective of its severity, that does not entail an 
“official company act” that somehow ratifies the harassment, appears 
vulnerable to the affirmative defense.33 
The promulgation of Title VII’s jurisprudential framework in 
Faragher and Ellerth met with a skeptical response from many 
scholars.34  Professor Joanna Grossman examined the promulgation of 
 30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 31. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 148-49 (adding that “[a]bsent such an official act, the extent to which the 
supervisor’s misconduct has been aided by the agency relation, as we earlier recounted . . . is less 
certain”).  The Suders decision was eagerly awaited by many members of the legal and academic 
communities.  See, e.g., Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote, The Supreme Court’s Suders Problem: 
Wrong Question, Wrong Facts Determining Whether Constructive Discharge is a Tangible 
Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 819, 844 (2004) (arguing, after certiorari had 
been granted by the Court, that Suders’ “resignation was ‘ratified by the employer,’” and 
contending that the Supreme Court should “guarantee that resignations classified as constructive 
discharges would genuinely be the functional equivalents of formal discharges”). 
 33. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 148-49. 
 34. Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 
61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 671 (2000) (“[The Faragher and Ellerth decisions], far from imposing 
additional liability on innocent employers, . . . instead created a virtual safe harbor that protects 
employers from liability unless their own conduct is found wanting.”);  Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 
819, 844 (arguing, “if the Supreme Court were to resolve the inquiry of whether a constructive 
discharge is a tangible employment action in the context of a decision applying the [notice] 
approach it would answer in the affirmative”); Kerri L. Stone, Consenting Adults? Why Women 
Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment are Faring Better in Court Than Those Who Say No 
. . .  and Why They Shouldn’t, YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2008). 
[W]hen the [Faragher/Ellerth] cases and the principles and preferences that have 
emerged from their jurisprudence are properly viewed, it is clear that modern society 
continues to suffer from what may be called “Lewinsky syndrome,” a tendency to 
“rescue” from the consequences of their actions younger or less powerful women who 
decide to initiate or enter into intimate relations with powerful, often older men, for 
whom they work. 
Id. 
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the strictures placed upon liability in Faragher and Ellerth and observed 
that: 
[t]he common law extends to a dog the ‘prestigious distinction’ of 
being entitled to one bite before its owner becomes strictly liable for 
damages.  While this common law privilege for dog owners has been 
largely abrogated by statute, the Supreme Court recently adopted a 
variation of it for employers of supervisors who sexually harass their 
subordinates.35 
Essentially, Professor Grossman explained, the Supreme Court’s 
view on enterprise liability for supervisory harassment, “ostensibly 
grounded in traditional agency principles,”36 means that 
employers are now liable for the hostile environment created by their 
supervisors, for the most part, only after being given a chance to react 
and failing to do so.  In other words, for employers of harassing 
supervisors, as for the dog owners that preceded them, the first bite is 
free.37 
The significance of this insight cannot be overstated.  For better or 
worse, the Supreme Court has attempted to mediate and negotiate a 
balance between compensating harassment victims and contouring a 
reasonable scope of employer liability.38  That having been said, when 
an employer knowingly situates a harasser as a new potential victim’s 
supervisor, it may not have acted negligently as a de facto matter, but the 
employer ought to be seen as having assumed the risk that it did not 
adequately cure the problem because the harasser may offend again in 
his new situation.  Thus, the victim, who had no ability to know of her 
harasser’s predilections or violent tendencies and had no ability to 
prospectively ward off harm prior to its occurrence, should be able to 
hold the defendant, who had every opportunity to act, for example by 
terminating or adequately disciplining the harasser, legally accountable 
for the harm sustained. 
II.  PREMISES 
There are two premises upon which this idea is based.  The first is 
 35. Grossman, supra note 34, at 671. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (“[A]ccomodat[ing] the agency principle of vicarious 
liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic 
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees . . . .”). 
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that the population of supervisory harassers is rife with recidivist 
offenders whose behavior, far from stemmed by the slaps on the wrist 
they often received, often escalates over time.39  The second is that most 
claims of harassment are typically dealt with internally and not argued 
before a court.  However, in those cases that are adjudicated, courts have 
sanctioned the mere physical separation of a harasser and his 
complaining victim as a legally adequate remedial response to a 
complaint.40 
It is often the case that sexual harassers who engage in physical 
assaults or rape of their subordinates are recidivist offenders in that they 
either have a criminal record of sexual violence or a discernible 
tendency toward sexual harassment revealed by their record on the job.41  
It is often the case that a sexual harasser has already engaged in 
harassing or even criminal behavior, either at his current workplace or a 
previous one.42 
Moreover, employers will often slap harassers on the wrist and 
merely transfer them away from their victims, rather than expose the 
harasser’s wrongdoings and end their opportunities to engage in such 
acts.43  Most of the information that scholars have gathered about the 
handling of sexual harassment under the law comes from court records 
 39. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 350 (1990). 
 40. Hall et al., supra note 12, at 732 (“[R]ecidivism rates are most commonly based on 
official arrest data, which may underestimate actual rates of offending.”). 
 41. See Paul, supra note 39, at 350 (“[I]t is undoubtedly true that many practitioners of sexual 
harassment are recidivists. . . .”). 
 42. See West, supra note 9, at 505 (“Large employers, primarily public employers, face the 
problem of repeat harassers.”).  See also Jordana Mishory, Teen Sues Over Sex with Boss, MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV. June 20, 2007, at 1 (discussing a case in which a fifteen year old and her mother 
sued McDonalds over what they alleged was her sexual harassment by a McDonalds franchisee.  In 
the suit, the teenager alleged that her harasser dated another minor employee prior to commencing 
his inappropriate relationship with her and that the company knew about this.); Paul, supra note 39, 
at 350. 
 43. See Diane Gentry, Title VII Limitations — Keeping the Workplace Hostile, 9 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 393, 406 (2003). 
[T]he remedies provided by employers to redress harassment further promotes sexism 
because they do not really change the male dominated work culture.  Employees who are 
harassed are “protected” by their employer, while the offending party may be re-routed, 
and the behavior temporarily pre-empted . . . .  Separating women from individual 
harassers without addressing the pervasiveness of sexist conduct does nothing to 
effectively end sexism.  Instead, it reinforces the perception that women do not belong in 
the workplace. 
Id. 
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and opinions in cases brought against defendant entities.44  However, 
most claims of sexual harassment on the job are handled internally.45 
Numerous cases’ facts and records reveal that separating a harasser 
and a complaining victim is a common practice when employers attempt 
to grapple with complaints of harassment made through established 
internal channels.46  To the extent that a harassing supervisor adds value 
to a defendant enterprise, it has every reason to want to allay a 
harassment situation without losing or exacting too much retribution 
upon him; he may even be promoted within the enterprise.47 
All too often employers respond to allegations of sexual harassment 
by offering the complainant an opportunity to transfer to a different 
branch, division, or department.48  In one particularly egregious 
scenario, a sexual harassment complainant requested a transfer so that 
she would no longer be under the supervision of her alleged harasser.  
She was subsequently discharged after rejecting the only transfer 
offered, which was to a unit in which she had been physically attacked 
previousl 49
One scholar has taken note of the problem of employers retaining 
and resituating harassers as other employees’ supervisors, suggesting 
that: 
if an employer continues to employ a harassing supervisor or other 
employee, employers should be obligated to inform employees who 
must work with the harasser about the resolution of the prior complaint 
 44. See West, supra note 9, at 465-66. 
 45. Dave Simanoff, Law Firms Address Harassment Issues, TAMPA TRIB., April 6, 2005, at 1 
(calling harassment at law firms “an industrywide issue often dealt with behind closed doors”). 
 46. See, e.g., McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2005); Scarberry v. 
Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2003); Stephens v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 220 
F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2000); Mikels v. City of Durham, N.C., 183 F.3d 323, 326 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
 47. See, e.g., Simanoff, supra note 45, at 1 (noting that in 2005, a prominent Florida law firm 
promoted to its number three spot a partner who had been disciplined for sexual harassment). 
 48. See, e.g., Stuart v. GMC, 217 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant employer's 
response to sexual harassment was adequate as a matter of law where it promptly investigated the 
complaint, redistributed sexual harassment policy, and offered the plaintiff a transfer to a different 
department, thus ending the harassment); Dees v. Johnson Controls World Serv. Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 
420-21 (11th Cir. 1999) (following plaintiff’s formal complaint of harassment, employer’s prompt 
remedial response of transferring her to another department warranted its summary judgment on her 
sexual harassment claim); see, e.g., Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 779 (10th Cir. 2000) (transferring 
sexual harassment complainant was a reasonable remedial reaction to complaint); Webb v. 
Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc., 139 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable remedial 
response to offer to transfer plaintiff to another office so that she would have no further contact with 
her alleged harasser). 
 49. Yancey v. Nat’l Ctr. on Inst. and Alternatives, 986 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Md. 1997). 
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and any discipline taken.  Otherwise, if the person harasses another 
employee, the employer should be liable for greater damages for the 
subsequent harassment.50 
Thus, it is clear that unwitting first-time victims of harassment are being 
victimized, in many cases, by recidivist harassers, known to be such by 
their employers. 
III.  THE LAW INCENTIVIZES MANY EMPLOYERS’ “BANDAID” 
APPROACH TO DEALING WITH RECIDIVIST HARASSERS: AN 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
These premises having been established, the problem inherent in a 
workforce replete with recidivist harassers that companies are likely to 
transfer rather than terminate or reform is compounded by the courts’ 
treatment of these scenarios.  The problem of courts’ failure to hold 
employers to high enough standards for staving off harm is epitomized 
by a 2002 Seventh Circuit sexual harassment case.  In Longstreet v. 
Illinois Department of Corrections,51 the plaintiff alleged that two 
incidents, occurring thirty days apart, amounted to actionable sexual 
harassment.52  The first incident involved a co-worker verbally harassing 
her and masturbating in front of her,53 and the second was a sexual 
assault that she sustained from a different co-worker.54  As the court 
recited, “[i]t is, we think, difficult to determine which of the two 
incidents [she] complains about, if true, was worse. Both were close to 
9’s on a scale of 10.”55 
As the court further explained, however, because the individual in 
the first incident was, “in all practical respects”56 fired, while the other 
harassment (the alleged sexual assault) was an “isolated incident,” her 
evidence could “hardly” form the basis of an actionable sexual 
harassment claim.57  The plaintiff could not contend that the defendant’s 
actions were “not sufficient to remedy the harassment.”58  “The answer,” 
the court deduced, 
 50. West, supra note 9, at 506. 
 51. Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t. of Corr., 276 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 52. Id. at 381. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Longstreet, 276 F.3d at 381. 
 57. Id. at 383. 
 58. Id. at 382. 
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seems to be that her real contention is that the DOC was negligent not 
so much in its response to her complaints but in not preventing the 
harassment in the first place.  She says that both Bester and Bills 
harassed others before her. The contention is that if the DOC had taken 
reasonable steps in connection with those prior incidents, these 
unpleasant things would not have happened to her.59 
Recognizing that there had been a prior incident of one of her 
harassers having harassed another woman at work and been reassigned, 
the court nonetheless rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “if the men 
had been properly dealt with in the other incidents, they would not have 
been recidivists,”60 and that although the other harassed employee “was 
satisfied with the resolution of her case, the DOC had an independent 
obligation to make a further investigation and to make certain that [he] 
clearly understood that his reassignment was a result of his bad 
behavior.”61 
The court acknowledged that “[a]n employer must take more care 
to protect employees, depending on the seriousness of the harassment,”62 
but equivocated, stating that, “[i]n this case, we must determine how far 
those principles can be stretched.”63  Refusing to link its assessment of 
the defendant’s handling of the prior instance of harassment to employer 
liability for any harm sustained in the plaintiff’s current case, the court 
determined that “[t]he proper measure of the reasonableness of the 
DOC’s response was dependent on the facts and circumstances of that 
case.  Short of litigating Terry’s situation in Longstreet’s case, there is 
little to be said about it except that the DOC response was not obviously 
unreasonable.”64  Rejecting the idea that the defendant was obligated to 
be on notice of the possibility that the harasser would be a recidivist, the 
court concluded that: 
[i]t would push the role of deterrence too far to say that a response 
which seemed to be within the realm of reasonableness in one situation 
can, if ultimately it did not have the proper deterrent effect, be the sole 
basis for liability in another case even if the employer’s response in the 
second case was clearly sufficient.65 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Longstreet, 276 F.3d at 382. 
 62. Id. (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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Disciplining the harasser without firing him the first time, the court 
conceded, “did not cure him of disgusting and boorish behavior,”66 and 
the plaintiff’s argument that she would have been spared the indignity of 
her own harassment if he had been fired after his first offense did have 
“superficial appeal.”67  Nonetheless, the court found, 
we cannot conclude that an employer is subject to what amounts to 
strict liability for every second incident of harassment committed by an 
employee, especially when the first incident was far less serious than 
the second . . . .  To say that the employer must be held liable in the 
second incident would be to impose strict liability on an employer any 
time an employee commits two acts of harassment.  It would be a two-
strikes-and-you’re-out rule.  To be safe from liability, an employer 
would always have to discharge a person accused of any kind of 
harassment because no employer can predict with certainty, any more 
than any judge sentencing a criminal defendant can predict with 
certainty, that an offender will not offend again.68 
This case illustrates how a plaintiff may be denied compensation for 
harassment which she could not foresee but which her employer may 
have been able to prevent even without her complaint. 
IV.  FACTORING IN THE GOALS OF TITLE VII 
It goes without saying that one’s rights to bodily safety and 
integrity in the workplace are inviolable.  Along those lines, numerous 
courts have held that a single instance of physical violence may rise to 
the level of an actionable hostile work environment, which, according to 
the Supreme Court must include conduct that is “severe or pervasive.”69 
 66. Longstreet, 276 F.3d at 383. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)..  See also Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding 
that plaintiff’s being called a “bitch,” being pinned against a wall, and having had her wrist twisted 
until she sustained ligament damage, drew blood, and required surgery created an actionable hostile 
work environment because “[a]lthough less severe acts of harassment must be frequent or part of a 
pervasive pattern of objectionable behavior in order to rise to an actionable level, ‘extremely 
serious’ acts of harassment do not”); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“[E]ven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability.”) 
(quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 
F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding a one time event in which a waitress had her hair pulled 
by a customer, who also grabbed and placed his mouth on her breast was severe enough to create an 
actionable hostile work environment); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 
196616, at *3-4 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000) (rejecting the argument that physical assault committed 
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It would seem to follow that allowing recovery under Title VII for a 
first-time, single incident of physical/sexual violence by a recidivist 
harasser comports entirely with the objectives and goals of Title VII, as 
well as those of the Supreme Court in crafting its jurisprudence.  The 
Supreme Court declared in Faragher that properly determining the 
contours of respondeat superior liability for supervisory sexual 
harassment “calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and 
malleable factors . . . but rather an inquiry into the reasons that would 
support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within the 
scope of a supervisor’s employment, and the reasons for the opposite 
view.”70  The linchpin of the proper query, or, as the Supreme Court put 
it, the “integrating principle” of respondeat superior is “that the 
employer should be liable for those faults that may be fairly regarded as 
risks of his business, whether they are committed in furthering it or 
not.”71  It ought to go without saying that merely transferring or 
shuffling around a known harasser without regard for what he does until 
a new instance of harassment is reported engenders a risk for an 
employer that may only be seen as attendant to the defendant’s business 
and the way in which it knowingly chose to run it. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Faragher that Title VII aims 
“to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful 
by defendant’s “employee was simply a one-time incident and was therefore not pervasive enough 
to create an abusive environment,” because it rose “to the same level of severity as sexual assault, 
and objectively carried sexual overtones”); Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“We have no doubt a single incident of rape can satisfy the first prong of employer 
liability under a hostile work environment theory.”); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII 
liability.”), abrogated on other grounds by, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  
There have, however, been numerous occasions in which single instances of sexual assault/physical 
sexual conduct were held not to rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment.  See, 
e.g., Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding male supervisor’s one-time act of 
rubbing his penis against employee’s buttocks in the presence of co-workers was not severe or 
pervasive enough to create sexually hostile work environment under Title VII); Lee-Crespo v. 
Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 38-39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding female 
supervisor’s improper remarks to employee, which included telling employee to invite her to lunch 
and making comments about plaintiff’s co-workers’ “private lives and sexual preferences . . . ” and, 
on one occasion approaching the plaintiff “from behind, hugg[ing] her, and whisper[ing] in her ear a 
request for a cookie from another table[,]” did not establish a hostile work environment); Tatum v. 
Hyatt Corp., 918 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding single episode in which supervisor wrapped 
his arms around plaintiff and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to demonstrate a 
hostile work environment; “absent the most stringent circumstances, courts have refused to hold that 
one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment”). 
 70. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797. 
 71. Id.  (quoting Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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employment discrimination,”72 but stated that its “primary objective,” 
was “not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”73  Thus, the Court 
concluded that it was bifurcating the realms of cases with and without 
tangible employment actions and crafting the affirmative defense as the 
EEOC wanted, to “recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to 
prevent violations and give credit here to employers who make 
reasonable efforts to discharge their duty.”74 
Each of these aspirations comports squarely with courts preventing 
the affirmative defense from blocking a plaintiff’s claim that she was 
raped or assaulted in a one-time incident by a known harasser and had 
no opportunity to make meaningful use of complaint channels before 
sustaining harm.  In the first place, a victim who has withstood the most 
noxious and egregious form of sexual harassment, an assault to, and 
violation of, her bodily integrity in her workplace or within the scope of 
her employment, will not be precluded from recovering damages.  
Further, avoiding harm is a goal best achieved when the law discourages 
employers, who are uniquely situated to know of supervisors with a 
history of harassment yet knowingly or recklessly place those 
individuals in a position to harass other victims, from doing so.  
Moreover, while it may be appropriate to credit employers who make 
reasonable efforts to stave off the harm associated with harassment, 
allowing certain employers to insulate themselves against liability 
sometimes rewards behavior that foments repeated instances of 
harassment. 
The Supreme Court in Faragher stated that another policy 
underpinning of its creation of the affirmative defense was the common 
law precept of harm avoidance and mitigation by the victim, which is the 
notion that if a victim “unreasonably failed to avail herself of the 
employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover 
damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.”75  Thus, the 
Supreme Court determined, under its framework that “if damages could 
reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer 
should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have 
avoided.”76  Again, permitting recovery in cases involving the one-time 
act of physical violence of a recidivist harassing supervisor does not 
contravene the precept of harm avoidance because the victim in such a 
 72. Id. at 805. 
 73. Id. at 806. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 806-07. 
 76. Id. at 807. 
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case has no opportunity to furnish notice to the employer, and has 
already sustained harm that he or she could not have prevented.  This 
Article next explores precisely how courts might go about applying the 
two-pronged affirmative defense in such a way as to accord less 
accountability to victims with no opportunity to report grievous harm 
that they sustain and confer more responsibility on employers who 
assume the risk of retaining a harassing supervisor. 
V.  CIRCLING AROUND A SOLUTION 
An obvious thought is that perhaps a court might consider a one-
time incident of physical/sexual violence to be a tangible employment 
action, removing the availability of the affirmative defense.  Several 
plaintiffs, however, have tried to make this argument to no avail, and 
federal courts have unceremoniously and summarily rejected it.  Other 
courts have refrained from addressing the issue altogether. 
In the pre-Suders Eleventh Circuit case of Walton v. Johnson,77 the 
plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued her employer under 
Title VII for sexual harassment, alleging that her district manager 
engaged in a variety of harassing behaviors on several occasions.78  
These behaviors included kissing her, grabbing her inappropriately, and, 
eventually, raping her.79  In the course of resolving her claim, the 
Eleventh Circuit declined to address Walton’s argument, made for the 
first time in her Reply Brief, that “the alleged rapes . . . by themselves, 
constitute tangible employment actions,”80 noting that the argument 
“was not raised below.”81 
However, it appears that even in that pre-Suders era, courts were 
poised to view even the most horrific criminal assaults on victims at 
work as falling short of being tangible employment actions.82  In 2003, a 
district court in Virginia, adjudicating a harassment suit in which the 
plaintiff was allegedly “rape[d] at knife-point,” found that “[e]ven if [the 
alleged harasser] were a supervisor, there was no tangible employment 
action taken . . . that would short-circuit [the plaintiff’s] ability to claim 
the Faragher / Ellerth defense,”83 because “[t]here was nothing done to 
 77. Walton v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 1276. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1283 n.10. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally Cooper v. City of Roanoke, VA, No. Civ. 7:02-CV-00673, 2003 WL 
24117704 (W.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2003). 
 83. Id. at *4. 
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[the plaintiff] that changed her employment condition through the use of 
supervisory power.”84  The court observed that “nothing . . . made [the 
plaintiff] defenseless against the harassment in ways that comparable 
conduct by a mere co-worker would not have done.”85 
Certainly following the Supreme Court’s 2004 pronouncement in 
Suders that the touchstone for the analysis of when an act is a tangible 
employment action is whether or not an “official company act” took 
place,86 it appears that even an actual rape would likely not qualify as a 
tangible employment action sufficient to confer vulnerability to the 
affirmative defense upon a plaintiff’s claim. 
In Allen v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services,87 a sexual 
harassment plaintiff alleged that she had endured tangible employment 
actions in the form of her supervisor’s “‘making of unlawful threats of 
discipline against her,’ his ‘physical assault, and his ‘unfair and 
discriminatory treatment . . . .’”88  The district court rejected this 
argument summarily, briefly noting that “[t]he physical assault did not 
change her employment status or reduce her job benefits.”89 
Another district court characterized a sexual harassment plaintiff’s 
contention that assaults she had sustained constituted tangible 
employment actions as an “effort to circumvent the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense,”90 holding that: 
[the] argument obviously lacks merit [because i]f sexually harassing 
behavior by a supervisor could, in itself, be construed as a tangible 
employment action, the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and 
Faragher would be a dead letter.  That is, every case involving sexual 
harassment by a supervisor would also involve a tangible employment 
action and would therefore preclude resort to the affirmative defense.91 
The problem seems intractable; as repugnant as the notion of being 
raped in the course of performing one’s own job and by the supervisor 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004) (“[W]hen an official act 
does not underlie the constructive discharge, the Ellerth and Faragher analysis . . . calls for 
extension of the affirmative defense to the employer.”). 
 87. Allen v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Serv., No. 2:05-CV-00707, 2007 WL 2815569, at *8 
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2007). 
 88. Id. at *8. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Serv.,Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
 91. Id. at 1267. The Court went on to note, “[a]ssuming [that] the Supreme Court does not 
intend its rulings to lack all force and effect, this Court declines to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of 
‘tangible employment action.’”  Id. 
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assigned by one’s own employer is, unless the rapist is aided by 
something more than the agency relationship itself, the affirmative 
defense may preclude recovery.92  The mere situation of one who would 
rape or assault a subordinate as a supervisor is insufficient to warrant the 
imposition of respondeat superior liability under the current framework 
employed by courts in Title VII cases.93  As stated, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that automatic employer liability for supervisory harassment 
“requires the existence of something more than the employment 
relationship itself.”94  Thus, it appears that even a one-time supervisory 
incident of the highest magnitude, like a violent rape, may permit an 
employer to elude legal accountability for Title VII damages. 
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
So what is the best way for courts to deal with one-time incidents of 
harassment severe enough to be actionable by themselves because they 
transform the victim’s terms and conditions of employment, but which 
do not qualify as tangible employment actions?  In such situations, 
courts should, in their analysis of the first prong of the affirmative 
defense, refuse to view the incident in a vacuum.  Thus, the fact that the 
harasser and the victim may never before have interacted with one 
another should not be dispositive proof that the employer should not 
have anticipated the harassing behavior and could not have “exercised 
reasonable care to prevent” it.  Rather, by undertaking a fact-intensive 
query, the court should look at 1) any knowledge that the employer 
might have had as to the fact that the harasser at issue was prone to 
inflict harm; and 2) what, if any, actions it had previously taken 
regarding the discipline, education, transfer, and situation of the harasser 
as a supervisor, to determine whether or not the employer exercised 
reasonable care in the prevention of the harm inflicted.  A proposal that 
revamps the analysis of the affirmative defense in order to further Title 
VII’s deterrence goals is not without precedent.95 
 92. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).  
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 760. 
 95. In 2002, Professor Martha West proposed that courts require that in order to have a legally 
effective mechanism for processing and dealing with complaints, employers should furnish 
information about the resolution of prior complaints to employees on a regular basis and provide 
documentation for employees as to the actions it took in addressing prior sexual harassment 
complaints.  West, supra note 9, at 497-98.  As Professor West explained: 
These steps would communicate to women that their fears are, in fact, unreasonable, and 
that they should be willing to report harassment in a timely fashion. If employers do not 
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This query should turn on a multitude of factors, and a host of 
varied scenarios will necessitate judgment calls as to the ultimate 
determination.  For example, when examining what knowledge about the 
harasser’s potential to harass might be imputed to the employer, ought it 
matter whether such knowledge was gleaned from the harasser’s 
documented experience while in the defendant’s employ, or from 
information received from a previous employer, a news report, a 
criminal record, or even from industry scuttlebutt?96  Moreover, how are 
the courts to measure one’s “potential” to harass?  Is it reasonable to 
predict that a habitual offender who is known to repeatedly tell 
inappropriate jokes in the office will escalate his behavior to include 
sexual assault?  Should it matter how much time has elapsed between 
incidents; after a long period of unremarkable behavior, might a 
harasser’s slate be reasonably “wiped clean” by the employer?  Finally, 
ought the courts treat an employer who has done more to discipline and 
educate a past offender differently from one who has done less or 
nothing upon a repeat offense; or should the fact and the severity of the 
new offense, a priori, establish that the former employer fell short of 
reasonable efforts to prevent it? 
These are important questions that courts will have to answer if 
they adopt this proposed approach to the adjudication of the affirmative 
defense.  The best way in which to address them is for courts to create a 
matrix in which to evaluate the strength of the factors of how and how 
much a defendant employer knew about the offender’s tendency to 
harass, the strength of the evidence demonstrating this tendency, and 
what, if anything, the employer did in the face of this knowledge.97  If 
voluntarily release information to employees about the resolution of prior complaints, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys should seek such information in future cases in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of employer procedures and to challenge an employer’s claim of 
reasonable care under the affirmative defense. 
Id.. 
 96. The question of what an employer should have known, in addition to what it actually 
knew, about a supervisor’s work and criminal history should also be implicated in this analysis. 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, employers will need to be aware of the relevant federal, 
state, and local laws that entitle them to or prohibit them from procuring such information.  See, 
e.g., COL. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204 (3)(a)(X)(A)(2007) (“[T]he custodian may deny the right of 
inspection of the following records . . . [a]ny records of sexual harassment complaints and 
investigations . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2005) (“[I]nformation which is deemed to be 
confidential . . . [includes] information generated by or on behalf of public employers or public 
employees in connection with any sexual harassment complaint.”). 
 97. See West, supra note 9, at 519. Professor West has advanced the argument that employers 
ought to inform employees that their new supervisor has a history of harassment.  Id.  She argues 
that: 
 Just as employers are not liable for the release of information at work about employees 
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courts use these guidelines, a workable jurisprudence developed against 
a variety of factual backdrops will emerge. Such a jurisprudence will 
counsel potential defendants to react to instances of harassment not only 
promptly and effectively vis-à-vis the reporting victim at issue, but with 
an eye toward the potential liability they could incur (or rather, fail to 
shield themselves from).  This will not only promote better discipline of 
harassers, but will also encourage better record keeping, reporting, and 
information sharing within enterprises.98  One scholar has already 
recommended that employers’ reasonable actions upon handling a 
complaint include publicizing what occurred and warning potential new 
victims of a retained harasser.  Professor West warns “[i]f victims and 
other potential targets of harassment are not informed, serious 
harassment could recur, an employer’s liability will increase, and 
women will have little basis for trusting the employer’s prevention 
policy.”99 
Thus, if a court finds that an employer did not exercise reasonable 
care in comportment with the first prong of the affirmative defense, it 
will necessarily find that the defense cannot preclude liability, because 
the defense requires that both prongs be met.100  This will obviate the 
need for a victim of a one-time incident severe enough to confer Title 
VII liability on her employer to argue her inability to report the harm 
before it occurred. 
This argument works both ways.  In the case of a one-time incident 
severe enough to confer liability on a defendant employer, the employer 
should not, as a matter if law, be able to make out the second prong of 
the affirmative defense, that “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
terminated for harassment, they will not be liable for informing employees that another 
employee or a supervisor assigned to their work area was found to have harassed in the 
past, but is being given a chance to improve. 
Id. 
 98. Professor West has advocated that courts require better record keeping and publicity when 
it comes to reported instances of harassment by proposing that in order to ensure Title VII’s 
jurisprudence comports and resonates more strongly with its stated goals of encouraging harm 
prevention of harassment, “courts should require an employer to demonstrate the effectiveness of its 
prevention policy by documenting for employees the actions it took in addressing prior sexual 
harassment complaints.”  West, supra note 9, at 497.  The author maintains that “[p]roviding data 
on an annual basis would . . . increase women's courage and would assist them in overcoming their 
fears of complaining.  It would also help prevent future sexual harassment, deterring would-be 
harassers by informing them that such behavior could result in discipline or discharge.”  Id. at 498. 
 99. Id. at 520. 
 100. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998). 
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by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”101  This is tautological in 
all cases of one-time instances of harassment, despite various courts’ 
assertions that as a matter of fairness to an unaware defendant, such a 
reading of the requirement should not arrest the defense.102  However, in 
cases of a one-time incident perpetrated by a recidivist harasser, these 
fairness concerns evaporate.103 
It is important to note that any so-called “penalty” imposed on 
employers who situate a known harasser as a new victim’s supervisor by 
such an analysis of the affirmative defense is only meted out after the 
new harm has been inflicted; in other words, after the employer has been 
shown to have lost any bet it placed on the harasser’s ability to cease his 
behavior. 
While no court has used the approach suggested above, some 
inroads have been made.  Several courts have already evinced some 
open-mindedness in their adjudication of incidents like workplace rapes.  
Some courts have already recognized that rote, mechanistic application 
of the traditional framework and the affirmative defense may not always 
best serve justice. 
In the first place, courts have recognized that “workplace rapes” 
need not always take place in the actual workplace to confer respondeat 
superior liability on defendants who fail to adequately protect their 
employees.  This recognition evinces courts’ willingness to depart from 
a strict insistence that any act occurring off the employer’s physical 
premises cannot confer liability on the employer. 
Moreover, under a negligence theory usually employed in cases of 
co-worker harassment, courts have deemed employers to be on notice of 
a harassing environment, whether or not any complaints have been filed.  
Additionally, courts have deemed employers negligent in their failure to 
cure the problem, and thus liable under Title VII for the harm inflicted.  
Courts have recognized that even though a given plaintiff may not have 
previously complained about a specific harasser, a defendant may be 
deemed to be on notice of the harasser’s potential to inflict harm upon 
those with whom he is situated such that formal prior notice in the form 
of a complaint by the instant plaintiff may not be a prerequisite for 
respondeat superior liability.  The case of Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc.,104 which deals with an allegation of co-worker,105 not supervisory, 
 101. Id. at 807 (emphasis added); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
 102. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 103. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 104. Id. 
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rape and harassment, is instructive on these points.  In that case, a female 
flight attendant sued the airline for which she worked under Title VII 
and made New York state law claims of negligent retention and 
supervision after a co-worker, a male flight attendant, allegedly raped 
her in his hotel room during her flight crew’s brief layover in a foreign 
country.106  The plaintiff raised evidence that the airline had previously 
been on notice of her alleged rapist’s sexually abusive conduct, 
including a prior alleged rape and sexual assault, with other co-
workers.107 
With respect to the defendant’s duty to responsibly supervise the 
alleged harasser, the court found that a reasonable trier of fact could 
determine that the defendant’s negligence made it accountable for the 
rape: 
Delta had notice of Young’s proclivity to rape co-workers.  The fact 
that Young’s prior rapes were not of Ferris but of other co-workers is 
not preclusive.  If an employer is on notice of a likelihood that a 
particular employee’s proclivities place other employees at 
unreasonable risk of rape, the employer does not escape responsibility 
to warn or protect likely future victims merely because the abusive 
employee has not previously abused those particular employees.108 
The Court, however, tempered its holding by noting that: 
[h]ad the earlier non-work related incidents consisted of less grave 
conduct, such as off-duty flirtation, sexual innuendo, or crude talk, we 
might agree that such off-premises, off-duty conduct does not 
reasonably give notice of a likelihood that the person will represent a 
danger to co-employees or import his harassment into a work 
environment and therefore does not give rise to an employer’s duty to 
protect co-workers.109 
Nonetheless, it stated, “rape is obviously a far more serious matter 
[and t]he more egregious the abuse and the more serious the threat of 
which the employer has notice, the more the employer will be required 
 105. “It is well settled that an employer can only be liable for harassment by a victim's co-
worker if the employer was negligent – that is, only if it failed to provide a reasonable avenue for 
complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.”  Ayers v. State of Conn. Judicial 
Branch, No. Civ.3:99CV935 (AHN), 2002 WL 32094365, at *3 (D. Conn., March 28, 2002). 
 106. Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135. 
 107. Id. at 136. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 137. 
21
Stone: License to Harass
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
STONE_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:25 PM 
1080 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:1059 
 
under a standard of reasonable care to take steps for the protection of 
likely future victims.”110 
In Faragher, the Supreme Court expressly found that cases 
involving “actual knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials 
of an employer organization, of sufficiently harassing action by 
subordinates, which the employer or its informed officers have done 
nothing to stop”111 can result in employer liability where  “the combined 
knowledge and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as 
the employer’s adoption of the offending conduct and its results, quite as 
if they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer’s policy.”112  
The proposed analysis of the prong of the affirmative defense is entirely 
in comportment with this mandate. 
VII.  NEGLIGENT RETENTION 
It is important to examine the common law torts of negligent hiring, 
training, and retention when contemplating the form of analysis of the 
affirmative defense as has been posited.  Often, plaintiffs allege these 
torts as pendant state law claims along with their Title VII claims where 
they have been harassed by a recidivist supervisor.  Both these claims 
and the courts’ adjudication of the affirmative defense under Title VII 
are steeped in negligence theory. 
Based on traditional principles of agency law, an employer is liable 
for his negligence or recklessness: 
in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work 
involving risk of harm to others; . . . in the supervision of the activity; 
or . . . in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious 
conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon 
premises or with instrumentalities under his control.113 
The tort of negligent hiring, for example, thus typically confers 
liability on an employer when: 1) the employer hires one whom, at the 
time of the hiring, the employer knew, or should have known with the 
exercise of ordinary care, was unfit,114 2) through the negligent hiring of 
the employee, the employee’s incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous 
 110. Id. 
 111. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998). 
 112. Id. 
 113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958). 
 114. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960 
(5th Cir. 1994); Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 28 Fed. App’x 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Hutcherson v. Progressive Corp., 984 F.2d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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characteristics proximately caused the resulting injuries,115 and 3) an 
employment or agency relationship exists between the tortfeasor and the 
defendant employer.116 Many states, however, have relatively low 
thresholds when gauging an employer’s responsibility at the outset of an 
employment relationship.117  Some jurisdictions additionally require that 
the hiring of the individual at issue create a foreseeable or unreasonable 
risk of harm to third parties.118  Once an employee is negligently hired, 
the employer is obligated to exercise reasonable care to exercise control 
over the employee to prevent him from harming others.119  This is so 
even if the employee is acting outside the scope of his employment, so 
long as the employee is on the employer’s premises or on premises upon 
which the employee is privileged to enter only as an employee.120  If the 
anticipated harm occurs, the employer may be liable for it, irrespective 
of what the employee intended to do once he gained access to the injured 
plaintiff.121 
In terms of an employer’s exercise of ordinary care to ascertain an 
employee’s fitness, an employer is required to conduct a reasonable 
investigation into a prospective employee’s work experience, 
background, qualifications, and experience.122  Liability will ultimately 
hinge upon whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the 
employer exercised reasonable care in its investigation.123  The query 
undertaken by a court in adjudicating a negligent hiring suit will be 
whether the employee posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to 
one situated in the plaintiff’s position.124  Some indices that such a 
 115. Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Di Cosala v. 
Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982); Carlsen v. Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 886 (Wash Ct. 
App. 1994). 
 116. Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc. v. Stanley, 378 S.E.2d 857, 858-59 (Ga. 1989). 
 117. Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the Evaluation of 
Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA L. REV. 521, 536 
(2007) (“Much of the scholarship directed at employers advises them to avoid liability by checking 
conviction records, despite the fact that negligent hiring case law has consistently failed to find a 
general duty to check applicants’ criminal records.”). 
 118. Id. at 537. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 42 A.2d 1052, 1059-60 (Pa. 1999). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 440 (R.I. 1984); 
Carlsen v. Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
 123. Perryman v. DeKalb County Hosp. Auth., 398 S.E.2d 745, 745-46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); 
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983); Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990 
S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1998); Se. Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 
1999). 
 124. Janssen v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 731 P.2d 163, 166 (Ha. 1987); Henley v. Prince 
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reasonably foreseeable risk existed are an employee’s discernible 
violent, destructive, or dishonest tendencies.125 Specifically, for 
example, if an employer fails to do a background check on a new hire 
with a criminal record for sexual assault, and that new employee 
subsequently harasses or assaults someone in the workplace, the 
employer should, in theory, be liable under a negligent hiring theory.126 
More specifically, an employer will be liable for its employee’s 
assaults against a third party under a negligent retention theory where 
the employer either knew or should have known, in its exercise of 
ordinary care, that the employee had violent tendencies.127  Employers 
will also bear liability for their negligent retention of employees who 
inflict harm upon third parties where precautionary mechanisms 
implemented by the employers to ward off harm engendered by 
predictable risks, are improperly administered, or are somehow deficient 
in shielding innocent third parties from an unreasonable risk of harm at 
the hands of a known offender.128 
However, the law of negligent hiring, training, and retention varies 
from state to state making it difficult to prevail.  Some states have 
Workers’ Compensation statutes or other laws crafted by the judiciary or 
the legislature which operate to foreclose such claims.129  Several courts 
have expressed doubt about or declined to answer the question of 
whether a Title VII violation can serve as a predicate tort in those 
jurisdictions that require that negligent retention, supervision, etc., entail 
George’s County, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (Ma. App. Ct. 1986); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 
(N.J. 1982). 
 125. Island Associated Coop., Inc. v. Hartmann, 118 A.D.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
 126. Background Checks for New Hires are a Must, N.J.  RECORD, Sept. 18, 2007, at 1. 
 127. Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 28 Fed. App’x 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2002); Garcia v. 
Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1986); Foster v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310-11 (Mass. 
1988). 
 128. Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 720 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 129. See, e.g., Pickett v. Colonel of Spearfish, 209 F.Supp. 2d 999, 1005 (D.S.D. 2001).  
According to South Dakota law, 
[u]nless the employer has commanded or expressly authorized an assault, it cannot be 
said to be the intentional from his standpoint any more than from the standpoint of any 
third person. Realistically, it to him is just one more industrial mishap in the factory, of 
the sort he has the right to consider exclusively covered by the compensation system. 
Id. (quoting ARTHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 
103.06[1] (2007); McClure v. Nolan, No. 96-2357-JWL, 1997 WL 458362, at *1  (D. Kan. July 15, 
1997) (“Kansas law does not permit employees to sue their employers based on a theory of 
negligent retention and/or supervision of another employee.”); Williams v. Dowell,  No. LX-725-3, 
1994 WL 1031277, at *3  (Va. Cir. July 25, 1994) (“Virginia's Supreme Court has held that there is 
no cause of action for the tort of negligent supervision in Virginia.”); McClements v. Ford Motor 
Co., 702 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Mi. 2005) (explaining that under Michigan state law, a common-law 
claim for negligent retention cannot be premised on workplace sexual harassment). 
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an employer’s disregard of an employee’s prior tortious acts.130 
Moreover, the standards for the torts of negligent retention, hiring, and 
training have been interpreted by those courts willing and able to 
entertain such claims in tandem with a Title VII claim as prohibitively 
exacting and high in many cases. 
In one 2007 Georgia district court case involving allegations of an 
employer’s negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of a sexual 
harasser,131 the court identified the central issue as “whether the 
employer knew or had reason to know that the employee was engaged in 
harassing behavior.”132  However, the court examined and rejected 
evidence that another employee had told the employer’s human 
resources employee about a third employee who had “hinted about 
sexual harassment” by the supervisor at issue, alleged that  he had an 
affair with this third employee, and asserted that seven employees had 
resigned because of him, resulting in the employer’s investigation into 
these charges.133  The court found this evidence insufficient to place the 
defendant on notice that the supervisor “had a reputation for sexual 
harassment.”134  The court also rejected the contention that the 
supervisor’s multiple sexual advances against the plaintiff were adequate 
to place the defendant on notice, noting that “all of the sexual advances 
occurred away from the workplace,”135 even though one occurred on a 
business trip and another happened on a lunch break during a work 
day.136  The court thus granted the defendant summary judgment on the 
claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision because the 
harassment was considered neither knowable nor foreseeable by the 
defendant.137 
Other courts have been similarly demanding.  In another recent case 
from an Alabama federal court,138 the plaintiff was wary of the man that 
she later identified as her supervisory harasser “[f]rom day one of [her] 
 130. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 250 n.12 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e 
decline to decide whether a Title VII violation can be the underlying tort for a negligent supervision 
or retention claim under North Carolina law.”); Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 774 
(4th Cir. 1997) (“On appeal, [plaintiff] argues that a violation of Title VII satisfies the underlying 
tort requirement [for a negligent supervision/retention claim].  Because we find neither an 
underlying tort nor a violation of Title VII, we need not address the question.”). 
 131. Orquiola v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 132. Id. at 1162. 
 133. Id. at 1139. 
 134. Id. at 1163. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1163-64. 
 138. Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (M.D. Ala. 2005). 
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employment.”139  She produced evidence that “[h]is sexual prowess was 
a topic of conversation in the . . . distribution center.  There were many 
discussions among hourly employees about his alleged sexual affair with 
a subordinate employee, and rumors abounded that he had impregnated 
her.”140  His verbal harassment of the plaintiff eventually “escalated into 
physical contact.”141  However, the court granted summary judgment to 
the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims for negligent training, supervision 
and retention, noting that under Alabama law, “the ‘incompetency’ of 
the offending employee in a negligent supervision claim must be based 
on an injury resulting from a tort which is recognized under Alabama 
common law.”142  Because, among other things, the plaintiff had not 
“identified the underlying tort claim upon which she relie[d] to establish 
her negligent supervision claim,”143 the court noted that “under Alabama 
law, ‘an independent cause of action for sexual harassment does not 
exist.’”144  Additionally, because of the defendant’s prompt attention to 
plaintiff’s complaints, once made, the court rejected the contention that 
the defendant had any actual knowledge of the supervisor’s harassing 
tendencies.145  The court similarly rejected the argument that the 
defendant was on constructive notice of these tendencies based on the 
private nature of the reported harassment and the fact that there was “no 
evidence that another employee made a similar claim to a managerial 
employee.”146  The court held that it was “not persuaded that the 
‘rumors’ of [the] alleged consensual affair with another subordinate 
employee is sufficient to place [the defendant] on constructive notice of 
[the supervisor’s] alleged propensity to engage in unwelcome sexually 
harassing conduct.”147 
State courts have also made prohibitive demands of plaintiffs 
alleging negligent hiring, retention, and training.  A security guard 
plaintiff in Brown v. Brown148 asserted a negligent retention claim and 
alleged that she had been raped by the defendant’s employee after 
having complained about lewd comments that he had made to her about 
 139. Id. at 1080. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1098. 
 143. Id. at 1100. 
 144. Id. at 1100-01. 
 145. Id. at 1101. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Brown v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. 2007). 
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wanting to assault her.149  Citing “concerns of foreseeability and duty,” 
the court granted summary judgment to the defendant.150  It noted that: 
Employers generally do not assume their employees are potential 
criminals, nor should they . . . .  The harm suffered by plaintiff in this 
case was a criminal rape. It is argued that this rape was a foreseeable 
result of Brown’s offensive speech. We disagree. Without question, 
Brown’s words were crude and highly offensive. Plaintiff’s complaints 
to one of defendant’s plant managers that Brown’s comments were 
offensive and made her uncomfortable, when coupled with her request 
that defendant make Brown cease making such comments, gave 
defendant awareness of Brown’s propensity for vulgarity and arguably 
positioned her for remedies . . . .  However, an employer can assume 
that its employees will obey our criminal laws. Therefore, it cannot 
reasonably anticipate that an employee’s lewd, tasteless comments are 
an inevitable prelude to rape if those comments did not clearly and 
unmistakably threaten particular criminal activity that would have put 
a reasonable employer on notice of an imminent risk of harm to a 
specific victim. Comments of a sexual nature do not inexorably lead to 
criminal sexual conduct any more than an exasperated, angry comment 
inexorably results in a violent criminal assault.151 
The court disavowed the holding “that an employee’s words alone 
can never create a duty owed by the employer to a third party,”152 noting 
that it would be “an entirely different case if Brown had threatened to 
rape plaintiff and defendant was aware of these threats and failed to take 
reasonable measures in response.”153  This required level of precision 
under the state law theory, however, is simply too high for most 
plaintiffs to meet.  As the dissent in Brown pointed out: 
Plaintiff reported Brown’s conduct not once, not twice, but at least 
three times to Brown’s supervisor . . . . Plaintiff told . . . the plant 
manager, that Brown continually made crude sexual comments to her, 
and she asked [him] to make Brown stop. Three other security guards 
informed plaintiff that they, too, had complained to their superiors 
regarding Brown’s conduct. Plaintiff also asked Brown to stop making 
the comments on numerous occasions. Despite these multiple 
complaints, and despite Gardner’s telling plaintiff each time that he 
would “take care of it,” Brown continued to bombard plaintiff with his 
 149. Id. at 315. 
 150. Id. at 318. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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sexually aggressive comments until he eventually raped her. . . .  The 
obligation to assess its employee’s fitness for a job falls on the 
employer, not on the victims of that employee’s actions . . . .  Indeed, 
the essence of a negligent retention claim is that the employer breached 
a duty to ensure that the workplace was safe . . . .154 
Taking issue with the majority’s finding that “sexually aggressive 
comments can never put an employer on notice,”155 and that “absent a 
criminal record or violent history, an employer cannot be held liable, 
‘solely on the basis of the employee’s lewd comments,’”156 the dissent 
argued that “any number of things can suffice to provide notice to the 
employer that its retention of a particular employee may need a second 
look.”157 Thus, it argued, the majority’s “new rule, . . . that as a matter of 
law, employers who are notified that an employee is verbally harassing 
another in a sexually aggressive way can never be held liable for 
retaining that employee if that employee undertakes to carry out the sick 
sexual fantasies,”158 is untenable.  This is but one exposition of the ways 
in which state courts have made the torts of negligent hiring, training, 
and retention copiously difficult for plaintiffs to make out successfully. 
Despite the fact that so many victims of recidivist harassers cannot 
prevail on claims of negligent hiring, retention, and training, the 
affirmative defense should nonetheless be read to permit a finding that 
an employer who has ample notice of a supervisor’s harassing 
tendencies or proclivities is liable for his recidivist acts.  In the first 
place, in Faragher, the Supreme Court expressly condoned a negligence 
theory of Title VII liability, finding that cases involving “actual 
knowledge by the employer, or high-echelon officials of an employer 
organization, of sufficiently harassing action by subordinates, which the 
employer or its informed officers have done nothing to stop”159 can 
result in employer liability where “the combined knowledge and inaction 
may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as the employer’s adoption 
of the offending conduct and its results, quite as if they had been 
authorized affirmatively as the employer’s policy.”160 The proposed 
analysis of the efficacy of employers’ policies and efforts is entirely in 
comportment with this mandate.  Thus, “an employer may be charged 
 154. Id. at 327 n.1 (Cavanagh, M., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 328 n.2. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 328. 
 158. Id. at 330. 
 159. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998). 
 160. Id. at 789. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/8
STONE_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:25 PM 
2008] LICENSE TO HARASS 1087 
 
with constructive knowledge of previous sexual harassment by a 
supervisor, even if unreported, if the harassment was so broad in scope, 
and so permeated the workplace, that it must have come to the attention 
of someone authorized to do something about it.”161 
Further, the language of the first prong of the affirmative defense 
says that the employer must exercise “reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.”162 As at least one 
district court has noted, “[i]t is hornbook law that the term ‘reasonable 
care’ defines the traditional negligence standard, which, of course, 
requires proof that the [defendant] knew or should have known that . . . 
sexual harassment was taking place, and did nothing to prevent its 
continuance.”163 The affirmative defense analysis should be done with a 
careful eye toward what an employer ought to know or reasonably 
foresee based upon that employer’s experience with and knowledge of a 
harasser with an eye toward its responsibilities under Title VII. After all, 
in a scenario in which a harassing supervisor is able to exact a tangible 
employment action upon his victim, such as a demotion or a paycut, by 
using the employer as his unwitting instrumentality and deceiving it into 
thinking that such an action is warranted, liability is imputed to the 
employer, irrespective of what the employer knew or expressly ratified. 
In a scenario in which an employer, operated with constructive or actual 
notice about an employee’s harassing tendencies, courts should be 
obligated to at least delve into a qualitative and quantitative search of 
that knowledge before denying the plaintiff Title VII relief on the basis 
of the affirmative defense. 
Moreover, the scope of Title VII and its aggressive aim to “strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes”164 justifies the interposition of a heightened 
standard of care when it comes to an employer’s ridding the workplace 
of harassment, especially when it comes to physical violence inflicted in 
the course of sexual harassment. If permitted to do so as a piece of 
protective federal legislation, Title VII can operate to deter recidivist 
 161. Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 882-84 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing 
E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mftg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1072 (C.D. Ill. 1998); 
Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989); Huddleston v. Roger Dean 
Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988)); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 
673-74 (10th Cir. 1998) 
 162. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 163. Fall, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 883 n.14 (citing, inter alia, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS  § 75, at 534 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 164. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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harassment and employer negligence where state tort claims cannot do 
the job. 
In light of the fact that both prongs of the affirmative defense must 
be established for a defendant to preclude a finding of liability, the 
second prong of the affirmative defense warrants special examination in 
the context of recidivist harassment.  A challenge to any plaintiff faced 
with a one-time incident of harassment is the fact that she is rendered 
incapable of utilizing a complaint mechanism to stem the harm prior to 
its occurrence, and thus incapable of meeting the second prong of the 
affirmative defense.  The Fourth Circuit in Watkins explained this 
principle: 
[a]lthough the Supreme Court did not speak to this issue in 
Burlington . . ., we cannot conceive that an employer that satisfies the 
first element of the affirmative defense and that promptly and 
adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment . . . 
would be held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability to 
satisfy the literal terms of the second element of the affirmative 
defense.165 
The court continued, reasoning that “[s]uch a result would be 
wholly contrary to a laudable purpose behind limitations on employer 
liability identified by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries: to 
promote conciliation.”166 
In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police,167 the Eighth Circuit held that 
the affirmative defense is available even where a severe act of 
supervisory harassment engenders an actionable hostile work 
environment prior to the victim’s opportunity to make a complaint, 
providing that the employer “takes swift and effective action to insulate 
the complaining employee from further harassment the moment the 
employer learns about the harassing conduct.”168 The court found that 
“[w]ithout expressly advocating strict liability,”169 the argument that a 
plaintiff with no opportunity to report harassment could not have 
unreasonably failed to act to prevent it, “when boiled down, leads 
inevitably to strict liability,”170 an intolerable result. Thus, the court 
 165. Watkins v. Professional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16 
(4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999). 
 166. Id. (citing Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1999)); 
Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 167. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 168. Id. at 772. 
 169. Id. at 771. 
 170. Id. 
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determined, “[s]trict adherence to the . . . affirmative defense in this case 
is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole,”171 and it was 
necessary to craft this “modified Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense.”172 
Irrespective of the wisdom of this “modified defense” generally,173 
its application is wholly unjust in the case of a recidivist harasser who 
has engaged in a single act of harassment with a new victim.174 In 
McCurdy, the court deemed it “a fair question to ask who should bear 
the responsibility for a single incident of supervisor sexual harassment, 
an innocent employee . . . or an employer like the ASP who effectively 
stops the harassment after it learns about it.”175  The court noted that the 
Supreme Court did not contemplate a one-time incident when it crafted 
the affirmative defense, but that: 
[t]o reach a conclusion that the affirmative defense is unavailable in 
single incident cases in which the employee takes advantage of 
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer and 
the employer thereafter takes swift and effective action to avoid further 
offensive conduct stands the underlying policy behind the affirmative 
defense on its head.176 
The court found that “[d]enying such an employer an opportunity to 
avail itself of the affirmative defense, when the employer has done all 
that an employer could reasonably be expected to do to avoid and 
remedy the offending behavior, effectively creates strict liability for 
employers in a single incident case.”177 
However, in the case of a recidivist harasser, an employer has not 
done all that it could be reasonably expected to do to stem the harmful 
behavior in the workplace, or at least to ensure that no additional 
employees would fall victim to it.  For this reason courts should find 
that, in the case of recidivist harassment, a victim has not unreasonably 
failed to avail herself of effective channels of complaint where she, with 
no warning, sustained a single incident of harm severe enough to be 
actionable on its own.  Notwithstanding, a court need only find that one 
 171. Id. 
 172. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772. 
 173. See John C. Ayres, Note, Is It Sexual Harassment Or Not? The Single Incident Exception: 
McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 71 MO. L. REV. 205, 221-22 (2006). 
 174. Id. at 221-26. 
 175. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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of the two prongs of the affirmative defense was not met for liability to 
be conferred upon a defendant. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The current way in which courts approach the framework for 
adjudicating sexual harassment cases brought under Title VII does an 
immense disservice to victims of recidivist harassment.  Because courts 
have sanctioned, and thus incentivized employers’ mere movement of 
harassers around an enterprise and away from their prior victims, and 
because so many who engage in harassment are likely to continue or 
escalate their behavior without ample deterrence from doing so, new 
victims of recidivist harassers are especially vulnerable.  Courts need to 
conduct their analyses of the affirmative defense available to defendants 
with an eye toward whether or not the harasser at issue is a repeat 
offender, and stop looking at each incident of harassment in a vacuum.  
Only when employers are incentivized to view themselves and their 
various departments as an integrated whole and to respond to each viable 
complaint of harassment by actually exercising “reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”178 will 
the unwitting victims of one-time, often violent acts by recidivists stop 
paying the price exacted by courts’ lenience. 
 178. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 807 (1998). 
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